Dušan Ristić, Dušan Marinković

THE DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY AND THE BIRTH OF SOCIOLOGY: A FOUCALDIAN PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT

This paper is genealogical research that aims to present one of the historical ways that led to the emergence of sociology as a modern science. We discuss how and why this kind of genealogical research is important for explaining the emergence, transformation and regionalisation of power/knowledge. By following the arguments developed by Michel Foucault, we argue that the disciplinary practices emerging in European societies during the 18th and 19th centuries strongly influenced the upsurge of power/knowledge that would be transformed in sociology. We conclude that the appearance of the institutions – elements of what Foucault called the disciplinary society – led to the rise of new discourses of their legitimisation and to the birth of sociology.

KEYWORDS: discipline, Foucault, genealogy, power/knowledge, sociology

Disciplinarna družba in rojstvo sociologije: foucaultovska perspektiva

IZVLEČEK

Pričujoči prispevek predstavlja genealoško raziskovanje, ki ima za cilj predstaviti eno od historičnih poti, ki so vodile k nastanku sociologije kot moderne znanosti. V njem razpravljamo o tem, kako in zakaj je ta tip genealoškega raziskovanja pomemben za pojasnjevanje nastanka, transformacije in regionalizacije moči/vednosti. Na sledi argumentov, ki jih je razvil Michel Foucault, trdimo, da so prakse discipliniranja, ki so se pojavile v evropskih družbah v 18. in 19. stoletju, močno vplivale na pojav moči/vednosti, ki se bo transformirala v sociologijo. Prispevek zaključimo s tezo, da pojav institucij – elementov tega, kar Foucault imenuje disciplinirajoča družba – vodi k vzponu novih diskurzov njihovih legitimacij in k rojstvu sociologije.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: discipline, Foucault, genealogije, moč/vednost, sociologija
1 Introduction

One of the most important questions that tackle the very identity of social theory and sociological knowledge is the question of its legitimization. If we aim to reveal the social aspects of the processes of legitimization, the following questions arise: What kind of knowledge are we speaking of? What (social) authority and power stands behind that knowledge? Or, in other words: Whose knowledge matters? (Weiler 2009).

In the Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Alvin Gouldner wrote that: “Academic Sociology is a science of repeatedly new beginnings; which is to say, it has a strange tendency towards amnesia” (Gouldner 1970: 159). The lack of agreement over the meaning of social theory is constantly present in sociological discourse. As a reflexive discipline, sociology understands that “its own project is part of the social reality it studies” and that a sociological understanding of society is an integral part of what society is (McCarthy 1996: 8).

Gouldner also pointed that “it is not possible to write a viable history of social theory today without creating a new intellectual genre – a genre which will be one part history, one part sociology, one part criticism, the whole encompassed in a membranous boundary permitting mutual access of facts to values and of technical analysis to cultural interests” (Gouldner 1965: 168; Calhoun 1995). Within the field of sociology, he recognized the need for questioning the problem of social change and the tendency to explain its own paths or genealogy of changes (Antonio 2005). However, it seems that sociology has lacked the analytical tools for doing it on its own. Not because of its underdevelopment, but because of the complexities of the social reality.

From a different perspective, Foucault’s studies have shown that the analysis of political, economic and institutional regimes of the “production of truth” in society is possible if various regimes of discourse are explored through genealogical re-contextualization. This kind of research revealed the fact that knowledge is always tied to a technology of power: discipline, surveillance (Foucault, 1995), control (Foucault, 1998; 2006), etc., hence the importance of genealogical research. In sociology, it is primarily reflected in the fact that it can “narrow down” the problem of the general history of knowledge and transfer it from global to local level (Foucault 1984b: 90). The genealogy also aims to trace the origin of sociological knowledge by “localizing” it and in that way “protecting” us from the generalizations of the total history (Foucault, 1984d: 250).

This paper addresses the importance of the genealogical research in the analysis of the history of sociology as a modern science1. Our aim is to explain the significance of the disciplinary practices and the rise of what Foucault (1995) called the disciplinary society for the emergence of sociological discourse. Still, we examine just one of the “genealogical paths”, through the connections between disciplinary practices and their infusion in the epistemological apparatus of social sciences. In other words, we examine how institutional practices and procedures – that have emerged during the 18th and 19th centuries

---

1. This article is based on the paper presented at the ‘Annual Meeting of the Slovenian Sociological Association 2015 – Sociology between Producing Knowledge and Shaping Society’ that was held from 6th to 7th November 2015 in Ljubljana, Slovenia.
in European societies, became the modern disciplinary regime of power/knowledge and how they have influenced the emergence of the scientific discourse on society.

2 Regional character of knowledge and the genealogical project

Moving through the genealogical paths of “local” European geography and a number of common fields where knowledge has been produced, we are introduced into the field of research – the field of politics and fields of power and resistance. In defining what knowledge is, we can use different concepts, due to the fact that no knowledge is shaped without a system of communication, registering, accumulation, and shifting (Foucault 1994: 389). Hence, the recognition of the fact that knowledge and power are closely related is nothing new, and it can be found in the many works from Marx to Foucault.

Knowledge has the relational and regional character. It means that the changes in the processes of its legitimization “cannot be explained – at least not exclusively – in terms of the content of knowledge itself” (Weiler 2009: 3). The knowledge is never autonomous in the absolute sense. It is not independent of time, locality of space and geography, institutions and practices in which it is embedded. The regionality of knowledge considers it to be a spatial category. Knowledge is related to the context where it emerges from – regardless if its background is symbolical or territorial region. More important: “Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power” (Foucault 1980c: 69). In other words the regionalization of knowledge signifies the differences in “an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge”, as well as “the relations of power which pass via knowledge” (Foucault 1980c: 69). In addition, the perspective of the regionality of knowledge also points to its relationality in the sense of its different ways of interconnectedness to some context (for instance, through the practices of teaching, administration, politics, power, etc). Relationality is the characteristic feature of scientific knowledge (Latour 2007: 16). For instance, one possible genealogical line of the regionalization of (scientific) knowledge can be seen through the history of universities in Europe, since the public and anonymous knowledge have been constituted partially because of the institutionalization of universities during the 12th century in Western Europe. However, the other genealogical line, or the subject of our interest in this enterprise, leads us in paths of Enlightenment and the rise of the practices of disciplining knowledge in different social fields.

Knowledge has been firmly connected with science for many centuries, and science converted knowledge into the “regime of the truth” by different, “local” practices and institutions – always in order to monopolize it, globalize it and universalize it. However, we should not forget that the term “knowledge” includes not just the scientific knowledge, but all the possible types of knowledge identified in past and present societies. In other words, anything that counts as knowledge (McCarthy 1996: 16). Knowledge is not just the knowledge of truth in the scientific sense of the word, but also the knowledge of sense – because it secures basic interpretative and symbolic schemes for what people call
social reality. In an even more general sense, knowledge is the most immediate and yet mediated relationship between us and the world. It is the most immediate one because the world (necessarily) appears as a representation of knowledge; it is considered a mediator, because there is an entire symbolic system, interpretative mechanisms, concepts, interests, strategies, culture, politics, power, institutions and practices between us and the world. Knowledge is also a kind of ‘resistance’ to the unforeseen world events that do not depend on us (Marinković et al. 2014). Although these general claims about knowledge should ensure us to see knowledge everywhere and in everything, genealogy should help us to narrow down the means of its analysis.

Genealogical project and the research of the regionalization of knowledge aims to explain how a certain kind of knowledge is constructed, what can pass as acceptable way of getting at reality and how knowledge claims are justified and stabilized in social practices (Livingstone 2003: 88). Regionalization in this context could be defined as a social process that includes – depending on the sphere (politics, geography, culture, economy) – different criteria for delimitation between the social practices. Regions are not exclusively geographical units, just as geography is not only the question of space. Regions of discourses in society are based upon the fragmentation and differentiations of social practices and knowledge. This is because “knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault 1982: 208); to separate, distribute, classify, to produce different regions of knowledge and identities or subjects in the opposite sides of this “cutting”. Pierre Bourdieu wrote that regional discourse is the performative discourse whose aim is to legitimize certain definition of borders (Bourdieu 1992) – not just between the territorial regions, but also between the symbolic ones. In other words, the question of the regionality of knowledge is the question of the classification or the systems of classifications. Also, it is the question of division between the epistemological fields and subfields, the question of regionalization of subjects and boundaries between the sciences. They emerge, however, not as a consequence of “pure” research efforts of the scientists, but also as a consequence of the differentiation between social practices and spheres or fields of social action.

3 Enlightenment and the rise of the disciplinary society

If we look back in the history of sociology, we can see that it is the Franco-German fusion. We can also see that in the period of the emergence of the sociological discourse, there were structural and social fusions – or, the mixture of de-structured aristocracy and its socio-political conservatism on one side, and the middle class and its technical intelligence on the rise with their socio-political liberalism on the other. That is the deep dichotomous core structure of sociology and the reason why “sociology was thus at first the intellectual product of old strata that had lost their social power and of new ones that were still far from fully developed” (Gouldner 1970: 106-107).

However, when it comes to sociology, “the genealogy of knowledge must first – before it does anything else – explain the problem of the Enlightenment. It has to say what was at the time described (and was still described in the 19th and 20th century) as the progress of
Enlightenment, the struggle of knowledge against ignorance, of reason against chimeras, of experience against prejudices, of reason against error, and so on” (Foucault 1998: 178). In short, genealogy and its discourse-power axis, should examine the processes of institutionalization and legitimization of knowledge.

In attempt of tracing the genealogy of sociological discourse, we can notice that the 18th century and the Enlightenment were the periods of the “Great exclusion” (Foucault 1984c; 1995) and discontinuity between the two epochs or types of social order. In Gouldner’s terms, it was also the period when the “tragic vision of the world was fading away” (also see Marinković 2006; Gouldner 1976). Although we may wish to draw a dividing-line between the epochs, or between the different social orders and ontologies, the limit we are trying to set “may perhaps be no more than an arbitrary division” (Foucault 2002b: 56). Either way, we are speaking about the historical period, an archive (Foucault 2002a), and the transition and transformation of knowledge as well as the creation of the new “space” for the sociological knowledge to emerge. In other words, we are trying to detect the new ways of thinking, the era of new relationships among people and the emergence of the social as the type of the human relation, but also the way of legitimization of community. Society and the knowledge on society were formed as the system of practices and the system of scientific thought that has been significantly modified, and still lasts. In the long historical period, from the emergence of Protestantism, over the Enlightenment to the revolution in France, we can see a number of important social transformations that could be sublimed in the new type of social identity, social reality and the new Weltanschauung (Marinković 2006: 67; Chriss 2002).

The Enlightenment is, as Kant (1784) indicated in his famous essay “Was ist Aufklärung”, a “way out” – or the process that releases us from the status of “immaturity”. By that term he meant “a certain state of our will that makes us accept someone else’s authority to lead us in areas where the use of reason is called for” (also see Foucault 1984c). However, this historical period also provided the strengthening of a certain type of philosophical reflection, a problematization (Foucault 1984a) of the present time and articulation of the subject. But what is more important in the context of this paper is that during the 18th century, there was a development of many different types of technical knowledge (as a consequence of the demands of the production and the prices of these knowledges) and also “the development of processes that allowed bigger, more general, or more industrialized knowledges, or knowledges that circulated more easily, to annex, confiscate, and take over smaller, more particular, more local, and more artisanal knowledges” (Foucault 1998: 179).

At that time, in the “battle for the knowledge” and its legitimization, the State will intervene, either directly or indirectly, in four different ways. The first is by elimination or disqualification of “what might be termed useless and irreducible little knowledges that are expensive in economic terms” (Foucault 1998: 180). Then, by normalizing knowledges – clustering them together and breaking the barriers of secrecy and technological or geographical boundaries. The normalization also signified the unification or control of the “dispersed knowledges”. Third operation is hierarchical classification of knowledge while the fourth operation is derived from this one: it considers the “pyramidal centralization that
Dušan Ristić, Dušan Marinković

allows these knowledges to be controlled, which ensures that they can be selected, and both that the content of these knowledges can be transmitted upward from the bottom, and that the overall directions and the general organizations it wishes to promote can be transmitted downward from the top” (Foucault 1998: 180).

Hence, we can say that the 18th century was the century when different types of knowledge were disciplined and when the “internal organization of every knowledge became a discipline” – that allowed it “to eradicate false knowledge or non-knowledge” (Foucault 1998: 181). And the disciplining of knowledge led to the new way of systematization and organization of knowledge into the global field that we call science.

Besides the focus on the problem of the Enlightenment, the genealogy of (sociological) knowledge should also trace the development of the other “disciplinary dispositives” of modern societies since the end of the 18th century (Foucault 1995).

For instance, at the end of the 18th century, there were significant transformations in the “disciplining of space” in society. In other words, disposition of space started to serve significantly to the economical and political ends (Foucault, 1980d: 148). New spatial strategies or spatially mediated multiplication of discipline contributed to the formation of “pure community”, but also the “disciplined society” (Foucault 1995: 198). “Underlying disciplinary projects the image of the plague stands for all forms of confusion and disorder; just as the image of the leper, cut off from all human contact, underlies projects of exclusion” (Foucault 1995: 199). Clive Norris summarizes these two different social models of discipline and control: “Power over the plague victims is exercised by ‘differentiation’, ‘segmentation’, and ‘training’. In contrast, power over the leper is managed by enforced ‘segregation’, ‘separation’, ‘confinement’and ‘exile’ (Norris 2003: 250; see also Myers and Wilson 2014). Whilst “the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion... the plague gave rise to disciplinary diagrams” (Foucault 1995: 231). These schémas disciplinaires “require a strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, detailed inspection and order” (Elden 2003: 243). This was about a disciplinary project that multiplied spatialization – an area was divided into infected and uninfected parts, as well as the towns. Parts of the town tissue were “sick”, others were not.

Then we can also see the “dramaturgy of liberation” of the madman, also analyzed by Foucault. It was the differentiation of power/knowledge and the microphysics of medicalized disciplinary practice. That was the practice of power/knowledge within the heterogeneous spatialized forms – in hospitals, prisons, schools, army barracs, factories – with the disciplining and surveilling mechanisms that were applied to bodies. And the power/knowledge gained its discursivity precisely through these mechanisms – as the outcome of the disciplinary practices over the objects that were separated, classified, spatially distributed, medicalized (Foucault 1980e: 44). The best example and the substance of these “scattered” disciplinary techniques was the model of Panopticon developed by Jeremy Bentham (1995) and consequently, the concept of Panopticism introduced by Foucault. Panopticon “could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to alter behaviour, to train or correct individuals” (Foucault 1995: 203). But research procedures, which were too inquisitorial, would liberate space more and more for investigative analysis. Investigation would be established in opposition with research: “Such forms of analysis gave rise
to sociology, psychology, psychopathology, criminology, and psychoanalysis” (Foucault 2001: 5).

In all of these, we can notice the constitutive transitions in the disciplining order and the emergence of disciplinary society – through the institutions that have introduced the different types of disciplinary practices. In addition, those practices were getting more implemented in different social fields. We see the birth of different social institutions that articulate not just what Foucault called the power/knowledge, but also the positive knowledge: psychiatric clinics, hospitals, schools, modern universities, prisons, laboratories, etc. (Marinković 2006: 72). That is why the concept of power/knowledge reflects the permanent connection and intertwining of power and knowledge. Aforementioned social institutions, as well as the humanistic and social sciences, got the monopoly over time i.e. power and monopoly over the legitimization of knowledge.

In the processes of the general social and historical deritualization (Marinković and Ristić 2016) and rationalization of the Western societies at the end of the 18th century, we see the emergence of new types of discourses: legal, pedagogical, psychological, medical, and psychiatric. In other words, we are witnessing the grouping of the new regions of discursive practices and knowledge/power. For a long time, different statements could be come across in Europe: on wealth (which was not yet economy), on nature (which was still not biology), on representations (which were still not philology), on the lack of clarity of madness (which was still not psychiatry), on crimes (which were still not penology and criminology) – until they were homogenised and disciplined by the spheres and institutions that became the authorized places for the production of the legitimate knowledge (Marinković 2012). But even before the established autonomy gave a relative permanence to discourses, they were tied to temporality, cyclicity and periodicity of knowledge and communication as ritual practices. And just like that, by the end of the 18th century, a gloomy ceremony of punishment started disappearing along with the body exposed to public torture and execution (Foucault 1995). In parallel to these processes of the deritualization of punishing the body, many practices of saying, stating, uttering and knowing were deritualized (Ristić and Marinković 2015). Finally, through the different processes of disciplinary practices in 18th and 19th centuries – development of social institutions and disciplining the knowledge – many different objects emerged as the subjects of research. And one of them is society as the subject of sociology. These new subjects fulfilled new, regionalized and discursive spaces of knowledge creation.

Therefore, the disciplining of European societies from the 18th century did not imply that individuals became more and more docile or that societies were created just out of the prisons, schools or army barracks. It meant that societies were aiming towards more rationality and control of productivity and networks of communication – Entzauberaung der Welt – (Weber 2005). In these processes, we can see that different forms of power/knowledge are transferred through the disciplines and technologies of individual discipline, working, learning, procedures of normalization, sexual behaviour – whether we speak of the production with the economical purpose or of institutions that have the important function in the organization and control of the social action.
4 Transformations and transitions of disciplinary practices into sociological discourse

Overall changes and transitions in the disciplinary diagram of power signified the need to expand, fade away and diffuse the former norms of discipline that were limited to the localization and internment of the bodies in the classic prisons and military institutions. In other words, more subtle forms and practices of surveillance and control needed to be implemented in the emergent field of the social. One of them is the disciplining the knowledge creation and knowledge production.

As it was mentioned, from the end of the 18th century, a new social body emerged. It was the body of society. Along with this body, the new epistemological concept arose – the concept of population (Foucault 2007). Population is the multitude that lives, works and reproduces. Society and population were the great revelation: “What was discovered at that time – and this was one of the great discoveries of political thought at the end of the eighteenth century – was the idea of society” (Foucault 1984d: 242). In other words, it was the new body “which becomes the new principle in the nineteenth century” (Foucault 1980b: 55). The same matrices and models of discipline that had earlier been constructed over concrete, individual bodies would be applied to this new body. The trihedral measure-investigation-interrogation would be applied to the social body through the emergence and regionalization of knowledge: statistics, demography, economy, political science, sociology.

Through the collective body of the population the society becomes the object of the study – of a new anatomy, mechanics, pathology and panoptics. Through the population, society becomes the object of bio-politics (Foucault 2008). This abstract phenomenon – society – finally becomes visible. That is because population has its morphology and it can be measured, investigated and interrogated. It becomes visible through the new discourses on society that emerge – the rise and development of the sciences. Discipline and Punish, History of Madness and History of Sexuality represent the genealogy of the new practices and technologies of power/knowledge, especially during the 18th and 19th centuries. These are also genealogies of new practices of disciplining (Revel 2002: 21), that took place in space and that could not be possible without different institutions and techniques developed within those institutions. Those were the ways of disciplining the multitude – new social programs of institutions at their early stage of development in Europe. They have embodied the use of technical abilities, the “games” of communication and relations of power/knowledge. They have shown how system of objective purpose can be joined as a model of articulation and model of diffusion that in certain context (school, prison, factory or clinic) gives priority to the relations of power and docility. In addition, they have showed how certain institutions were able to become the places of articulation of epistemological models and dichotomies – for instance one between the normal and pathological (Canguilhem 2013). In a certain institution (factory, clinic), priority was directed to purposeful activities, or (in schools) to the relation of communication and disciplines of teaching (Foucault 1982).
If we aim to understand how those institutions and their legitimation of certain type of knowledge influenced the formation of sociological discourse, we should pay our attention to the problem of the normalization of the representations.

Social representations as „normalizing judgements“ are part of the social technologies of governmentality (Foucault 2010). In other words, representations are the instruments of discipline. One of the fundamental effects of power is the social acceptance and circulation of certain discourses – the ones that legitimize the social reality we are living in. The complexity of the social process of normalization is reflected in the fact that it does not imply exclusively the regime of discourses that circulates in one society (Neumann 1999), but also many different social non-discursive practices and other social technologies.

Institutions always articulate and legitimize the adequate forms or rationalities that organize doings. These are actually social technologies that can be applied in many different social fields in order to achieve certain social objectives. For instance, disciplinary technologies and the way the work is organized in economy, should contribute to greater precision, labor productivity and so on. In science, particular way of thinking and discipline contribute to a greater precision and elaboration of ideas, concepts and terms. They also contribute to the improvement and development of (scientific) knowledge. Social technologies are thus established and modified in accordance with different social norms and relationships. At the same time, they express the distribution of discipline and power/knowledge.

Social technologies are also the ways of homogenization and systematization of different spheres of social beaviour. Practices are complex assemblages of rational and irrational behaviour, but they are also the strategic and tactical freedom games (Foucault 1980a). It means that practices always contain the disproportion or the specific economy of relation of power/knowledge. They are not just the instruments of social control, but also the instruments of resistance. Discursive practices are the mean of reproduction of social technologies2 but also of their articulations (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Programs, technologies and dispositives of social practices are not ideal types in the Weberian sense, but elements that are articulated one on another. They are as real as the institutions that stabilize them, or as the behaviour of people (Foucault 1994). The consequences of social technologies can be seen in the whole social field, but for them to emerge it is necessary that tools, or the material machineries are used by diagrams in the certain disposition (Deleuze 2006).

In accordance with previous statements, the genealogy of knowledge should follow the genealogy of disciplinatory practices as the operative mechanisms and technologies

---

2. The notion of reproduction in this context signifies the repetitive acts or the repetition of certain social behavior and practices. It “implies continuity of a system or structure as well as human agency. More theoretically, the notion is used to bridge the well-known gap between the macro-level and the micro-level of social structure. Systems or abstract structures, such as ideologies, natural languages, and societal arrangements are thus said to be both manifested in, as well as made to persist as such through, social practices of social actors at the micro-level. A language like English is reproduced, daily and by millions of people, by its everyday use. And so are capitalist, sexist or racist ideologies” (Van Dijk 1998: 228).
that are placed within the institutions, within the certain relation of power and „fix“ them into a kind of reproductive setting.

Discipline is in Foucault’s work a principle “which is itself relative and mobile; which permits construction, but within narrow confines" (Foucault 1981: 59). It makes possible the individualization and authorization of discourse and is „defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments“ (Foucault 1981: 59). Discipline is not just the sum of what can be said about a subject: „Medicine is not constituted by the total of what can be truthfully said about illness; botany cannot be defined by the sum of all the truths concerning plants“ (Foucault 1981: 60). Discipline is the procedure of producing the truth, but also the errors that have the positive function of renewal and progress: “Within its own limits, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions; but it pushes back a whole teratology of knowledge beyond its margins“ (Foucault 1981: 60). It “fixes limits for discourse by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent re-actuation of the rules” (Foucault 1981: 61).

In addition, disciplinary methods made “the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility“ possible (Foucault 1995: 137). The historical moment of the discipline to arise, according to Foucault, was the moment when “an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful“ (Foucault 1995: 137-138). Discipline produced the subjected, practiced and “docile” bodies. The history of the different disciplinary institutions, with all their differences would show precisely the effects of those subjections, practices and “docility”.

What was obvious is that from 17th century onwards, mostly on the territory of Western Europe, we could testify of the development of the mechanisms of power that were applied in different social fields (education, punishment, production, reproduction).

Hence, the importance of the genealogy of institutions is considered to be as equal as the importance of their procedures and disciplinary techniques or the differences among them (for instance, between prison discipline, hospital discipline or school discipline). These institutions created different types of inmates as the object of the inquiry and complex procedure of surveillance and punishment (Foucault 1995).

As we have already mentioned, disciplinary techniques had to take into account a new phenomenon that was articulated like never before – new social body of population (Foucault 2007). Processing, controlling and surveilling of a large number of people

3. Foucault use the example of Mendel: “What Mendel did was to constitute the hereditary trait as an absolutely new biological object, thanks to a kind of filtering which had never been used before: he detached the trait from the species, and from the sex which transmits it; the field in which he observed it being the infinitely open series of the generations, where it appears and disappears according to statistical regularities. This was a new object which called for new conceptual instruments and new theoretical foundations. Mendel spoke the truth, but he was not ‘within the truth’ of the biological discourse of his time” [Foucault 1981: 61].
opened new types of problems as well as the need for the new types of knowledge – those of demography, health and other public policies, dealing with hygiene, life-span, fertility and so forth. These problems would also be of the specific interest of sociology, since its subject matter – a social body – was settled in the continuum between the individual body and the body of the population.

The techniques of the discipline were not considered to be the ideal types in one moment of history but more as the different techniques and practices and concrete behaviours that had the purpose to serve the particular, local needs (Foucault 1980a; 1994). For instance, we can see the disciplinary connection between the Quaker theory and prison punishment, since both insisted on isolation, solitude and silence. The obligation and discipline of silence were installed in the prison system and a reward for good behaviour was the privilege of speech (Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939). Everything that had to be said, spoken or shaped in utterances and discourses was supposed to happen in the spaces of the investigation – this was the only acceptable place to produce the utterances. There was, namely, a deep inquisition pattern – model “inquisitorial” (Foucault 1994: 391) – relation not only towards the body, but also towards the speech. Despite the fact that our representations were familiar with inquisition practices which use the body, those were to a great extent practices over texts and utterances. This pattern would later become part of the epistemological strategy of empirical sciences (Foucault 1994: 391).

In this pattern the body and the text (Ristić and Marinković 2015) were caught in the trihedral measure-investigation-interrogation, where the measure was a mean of establishing or re-establishing the order; the investigation was a mean of establishing or restoring the facts; interrogation was a mean of establishing or restoring a norm, a rule, a division, and classification (Foucault 1994:390). The Inquisition system became “one of the most significant juridical-political matrices of our knowledge” (Foucault 1994: 392).

The development of society also brought “a separation of the functions of the doctor and the priest, and then a transfer of moral regulation from the church to the clinic”, which gave Turner a basis to conclude that medicine occupied “the social space left by the erosion of religion” (Turner 2002: 22). This was a new codification, or rather a re-codification of practices by the technology of separation, that is medicalized classification and rise of the medical knowledge. Since the 17th century, body became both the place and the instrument of knowledge, a place of the new epistemology of empiricism (Wolfe and Gal 2010). Primarily, medicine, anatomy and pathology found the body as a place that could “produce” a new kind of texts, utterances and discourses or the new epistemology of the social sciences.

Now we can see how the disciplinary practices that have developed due to the social concepts of measure, investigation and interrogation are incorporated in the epistemological apparatus of sociology. The very practice of investigation, being essentially the inquisitorial model or form, has its long history in Europe and is not eventually embedded in scientific procedures and construction of facts. What was once designed primary for practice in courts and was modified during the transition from revenge to punishment, become applied in different social institutions and practices of governmentality. It also became important in the context of the development of the system of knowledge. What
once were social measures, techniques and technologies, later became the epistemological instruments, transformed into models of research in medicine, law, linguistics and in other sciences. Finally, it was articulated during the 19th century in the works of classic sociologists. For instance, Durkheim’s sociology appeared (as well as structural-functionalism in Parsons, or system theory) as the sociology of measure. If we considered the sociology of investigation, then we could point to whole field of empirical sociological studies and not just early, classical works. Subsequently, a good example of the sociology of interrogation would be Marxism and its varieties.

This is to emphasize that sociology and sociological discipline emerged from the certain social needs. They are inextricably linked to some social problem. On the other side, we have tried to trace some of the aspects of the development of disciplinary society that established the new norms to individuals and societies, and accordingly, made possible the development of sociology as a modern science. However, we should not neglect the other important aspect of the development of sociology such as the fact that it had appeared (both in France and in Germany) in the context of the serious threat to the post-revolutionary constellation along with the growing risk of jeopardizing social order. One of the ideals of the era of Enlightenment was articulated through the revolutionary practice, while other was legitimized due to the development of the concept of rational scientific discourse in society.

5 Conclusion

With all the changes that have led to the development of science in general, sociology in particular, as a modern discursive practice, there have been the unavoidable, constitutive transitions in disciplining order. This paper highlighted the most important outcomes of aforementioned processes through the emergence and development of institutions that began to produce the positive knowledge – psychiatric clinics, hospitals, schools, laboratories, etc. (Foucault 2003).

In every respect, the key elements for the broader genealogical research are given in the Foucault’s works that was only partly mentioned in this paper, not with the aim to present his arguments, but to interpret them in accordance with the question of the genealogy of sociology as a modern science – since it seems that Foucault’s analysis only indirectly tackled the question.

The aim of tracing the genealogical path of disciplinary practices and the sociological discourse was to show that regionalization of knowledge was possible when the social reality became “divided” and multiplied with the help of the Enlightenment. Furthermore, it was argued that fragmentation of different practices is possible due to the knowledge creation. Since the new institutions – prisons, schools and clinics were established, new discourses of legitimization followed, and that opened the space for the emergence of sociology.

Following these settings, we can conclude that social construction of knowledge is never exclusively one type of social practice – it is connected to the different spheres of
society (economy, politics, power) and it is emerging out of the different settings of power relations – hence power/knowledge.

There is still an open question of how far one could go in the research of the rudimentary forms of disciplining practices: all the way to the Roman legions and their regimentations, to the Benedictine monastic practices of discipline in the early Middle Ages? What is for sure, at least until our time came, is that society has become the primary generator of discipline and normalization – through the network of social institutions and knowledge that have emerged during the 18th and 19th centuries. In somewhat different forms, it lately overtook the organized social life in the Western Europe and beyond.

References


Foucault, Michel (1981): The Order of Discourse. In R. Young (ed.): Untying the Text: A Post-Struc


Foucault, Michel (1984a): Polemics, Politics and Problematizations. An interview with Michel Fou


Authors’ data
Dušan Ristić, PhD, Docent
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad
Dr Zorana Đinđića, 2, 21000, Novi Sad, Serbia
E-mail: risticd@ff.uns.ac.rs

Dušan Marinković, PhD, Full Professor
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad
Dr Zorana Đinđića, 2, 21000, Novi Sad, Serbia
E-mail: dusan.marinkovic@ff.uns.ac.rs