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LAND AS AN INDICATOR FOR NATIONAL RESOURCE BASED POLICY ISSUES: THE CASE OF SPATIAL RESOURCE DISTRIBUTIONS IN ISRAEL

ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary geo-spatial overview represents a conceptual foundation for policy research concerning allocations of public commodities as represented by land (settlement) resources. Principles of collective vs. individual rights to benefit from these may pose moral dilemmas for decision-makers. Such a conflict of interests could prompt ‘ambiguous’ governing decisions that lack clear directives for implementation. The resulting policies might support declarations of multicultural inclusivity while embracing exclusive ethnic communities. A case in point is the Israeli spatial policy on Arab and Ultra-Orthodox minority groups, analysed using primary and secondary sources and statistical data relating to political affiliations, income, housing costs and locational preferences. If land is an adequate indicator of ambiguous resource-based issues, further analyses should define how socio-spatial distributions are decided and at which particular stages of the policy process.

KEY WORDS: spatial inequality, socio-spatial control, spatial policy, land distribution, spatial resource
Zemljišče kot kazalnik nacionalnih politik do (naravnih) virov: primer distribucije prostorskih virov v Izraelu

IZVLEČEK

Ta interdisciplinarni geografsko-prostorski pregled predstavlja konceptualno podlago za raziskovanje politik dodeljevanja naravnih dobrin na primeru poselitvenih (prostorskih) virov. Načela kolektivnih nasproti individualnim pravicam do teh virov lahko postavljajo moralne dileme za tiste, ki o tem odločajo. Takšen konflikt interesov lahko spodbuja »dvoumno« odločanje, če ni jasnih smernic za izvajanje distributivnih politik, ki bi bile usposobljene za izvajanje podpor večkulturne vključljivosti etnično izključujočim skupinam. Obravnavan je primer izraelske poselitvene (prostorske) politike glede arabskih in ultraortodoksnih manjšinskih skupin. Analiza je podprta z uporabo primarnih in sekundarnih virov ter statističnih podatkov o politični pripadnosti, dohodku, stanovanjskih stroških in lokacijskih preferencah. Če je zemljišče primeren kazalnik za sicer politično dvoumno zastavljene družbeno-prostorske dileme o naravi virov, bi morale nadaljnje procesualne analize politik pokazati, kako in na katerih stopnjah se sprejemajo odločitve o distribuciji zemljiških (prostorskih) virov.

KLJUČNE BESEDE: prostorska neenakost, družbeno-prostorski nadzor, prostorska politika, prostorski vir

1 Introduction

In social democratic government systems, the finance or provision of public services may be expected to enjoy wide based public support (Jones et al. 2011: 5–16); e.g. targeted funding in favor of schools in socioeconomically deprived areas. Conversely, non-consensus is likely to arise concerning allocations of public commodity resources, such as land rights, to specific cultural, ethnic or minority groups (Zicherman 2016). Historical and symbolic events, regional demographic balance and the safeguard of cultural identity and heritage are cited in support of this practice. Personal liberty is cast as a human right to choose particular ideological, religious or cultural lifestyles expressed as identities within closed communities in geographical space (Kymlicka 1996; UNDP 2004 UNDRIP 2007; UNHCR 2014). If land is a commodity and a limited natural resource,
distribution of collectively claimed public lands means taking them from an entire state citizenry or national public and redistributing them to select beneficiaries (Portugali 1980). Actions in this realm, including free market initiatives, may benefit some exclusive populations, powerful lobbies or institutions over others, and are a noted source of conflict in terms of defining the public interest (Oliver 1991; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Conflict can also be rooted in questions of social ethics, ideologies, and emotions, which are likely reflected by the wide range of potential policy beneficiaries. Analysis of sources relating to the case of land allocations for large minority Arab and Jewish Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) populations in Israel should help illustrate how land, or more general spatial issues, might represent areas of policy conflict. Israeli national policy decisions regarding practical spatial dispersion issues may accommodate elements of political and ideological ambiguity generically inherent to circumstances of public resource distribution. Specific instances of land allocation should be considered indications for central theoretical and conceptual aspects of policy analysis.

While public policy is influenced by government agents, institutional determinants and dominant social value systems (Gertel and Alterman 1994), various lobbies and interest groups may bring ethnic, cultural, social or economic pressures to bear on policy-makers. Political decisions that draw conflicting views on allocations of public resources can be ambiguous, lacking guidelines for implementation (Hupe and Hill 2016). Richard Matland’s Ambiguity/Conflict Matrix (1995) establishes “conflict” as conducive to “ambiguity”, vaguery or

Report views cultural liberty as a human right, stating that “people’s cultural identities must be recognized and accommodated by the state, and people must be free to express these identities.” The UNCHR Fact Sheet No.21 (2014) supports freedoms including “the right to choose one’s residence, to determine where to live and freedom of movement”. The UNDRIP (2007) perceives protection of indigenous peoples as necessary for their survival, well-being and dignity.

4. Governments may make initial (closed cycle) investments in essential infrastructures, and allocate ‘harvester’ or ‘investor’ rights for resource development.

5. While the importance of Palestinian territorial issues representing conflict over international recognition of post-1967 land rights is noted, it falls outside the parameters of this article. Reference to Israeli land issues will relate to the two largest minority populations, Haredi and Arab, as an integral part of the fabric of Israeli society. This applies to territories covered by Israeli state law and populated by citizens and permanent residents eligible for citizenship. Territorial administrative areas A and B outside pre-1967 borders are not included. For expediency sake, area C will be referenced only in relation to the two large Haredi towns of Modiin Illit and Beitar Illit which are situated on the seam of the demarcation line. These towns represent important statistical and secondary information that would be difficult to separate from the larger body of data.
indecision on the part of policy-makers within policy processes. Conflict-oriented policy issues may induce a factor of ambiguity in the form of generalized policy solutions based on political compromise, as a way to balance decisions in situations not clearly articulated by institutional directives.

The purpose of this article is to offer a topical overview identifying land as a spatial commodity for study within relevant decision-making and policy processes. Multidisciplinary geospatial paradigms incorporating economic, political, sociological and ethnographic spatial concepts represent variables that may influence policy process. These should provide a framework of analysis to help us understand the reasons behind spatial (distribution) conflict, thereby enriching the constitution of literature that informs predominant policy models.

2 Applied foundations of spatial policy

Comprehension of sociogeographic allocations and distributions of land rests on paradigms of relative space, place and territory. As some societies ensure their place in space by imbuing land with a sense of cultural importance, locations such as Jerusalem’s Old City can affect and be affected by social, historical, political and cultural phenomena (Low 2017). Israeli spatial conflict between ethnocultural groups denotes this tendency where communities evoke collective appropriation of scarce land resources to harness democratic values, such as equity and inclusivity, to their political advantage.

Nevertheless, even culturally important physical space may comprise land resources as material commodities to be bought and sold at market or regulated prices. Harvey (1990) considers that control of space can be represented by an equation regarding the interaction between space/place, time (history) and money, such that land markets reflect supply and demand as well as controlling interests. Interests may be couched in institutional, community or personal value systems relevant to the spatial policy process (Powell and DiMaggio 1991), or in emotional and transcendental qualities of space that complement aspects of time and money. Low (2008) recalls Giddens’ sociological idea of space and time related actions based on rules constituting meaning and sanctioning routine acts powered by resources. Resources can be natural materials or authoritative actors representing personal or institutional interests. Similarly, Leicht and Jenkins (2007) focus on spatial perspectives of sociopolitical processes as they relate

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6. As the location of King David’s holy temple, Mohammad’s rise to heaven and Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection, Jerusalem’s Old City bears three different symbolic narratives. These 0.9 square kilometers have influenced and been influenced by sociological forces throughout history.
to power and the distribution of resources, actors with beliefs and ideologies, institutional values and historical, cultural or symbolic linkages.\(^7\) Howitt’s (2003: 150) geographic scale holds spatial configuration in dynamic terms, casting political institutions as actors, economic resources, resource distributors, social networks, protectors of territorial rights and holders of territory. His terms of space constantly change and evolve into “new landscapes of power, recognition and opportunity” (Howitt 2003: 150). Power can determine territorial boundaries, and those in power may use strategies to maintain their positions and grow. As such, policy approaches to pressures from powerful political or commercial entities and internal or external institutions may be significant. Yet weaker competitors might also tactically contest spatial domination, manipulating boundaries to their benefit (Low 2017: 19).

Scarcity of land makes it valuable because space is necessary for both individuals and societies. The properties of land in space are physically defined and finite, such that it’s every distribution benefits some by discriminating against others. This relates to Massey’s (1994) belief that some communities are empowered at the expense of others who are oppressed or disadvantaged. Refuting the idea that “application of any universal principle of social justice entails an injustice to someone somewhere”, Harvey (1996: 347–48), allows for policies of social justice that employ reverse discrimination to confer preferential allocations of scarce resources on minority communities. But could this practice actually be perceived to deplete majority benefits? One such instance of decision-makers’ attempt to counter balance minority development and land rights, for the benefit of the majority of citizens, is Israel’s Nation-State Law (Government of Israel 2018). Recognizing and encouraging the establishment and consolidation of Jewish land settlement as a national value, this law accentuates competition between homogeneous cultural communities for land resources and alienates excluded minority communities. Ironically, the law was proposed to offset perceived injustice suffered by the Jewish majority resulting from government policies of reverse discrimination favoring minority communities in distributions of public and land resources (i24NEWS 2018).

Perhaps the need to attain an elusive balanced distribution of resources in the face of separate, powerful and conflicting community interests has rendered the Nation-State law a prime example of a declarative policy statement lacking operative guidelines for implementation. As a result, it merely serves to maintain Israeli settlement policy in an ambiguous state. Professional meso level national and regional planning agencies are left to precede macro decisions, using only

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\(^7\) See also Oliver 1991.
the bare statutory or judicial directives to constitute a basis for implementation of spatial policy. This imperative is in keeping with the Israeli State’s Attorney’s (2004) directive on procedure for establishing new towns, beginning with professional level spatial feasibility analyses that progress through meso level statutory committees decisions and must ultimately be ratified by government. Thus spatial planning perspectives can be left open to interpretation based on existing or perceived socioeconomic disparities, heritages, cultures and lifestyles so that meso level agencies are in a position to offer professional guidance to conceive spatial order (Tama 35 2015).

A theoretical foundation for such interpretative spatial policy is Lefevbre’s (1991) three part concept of Production of Space, including: relations and practices in perceived space, conceived images of space and lived space which rests on the other two tenets. Human geographer Werlen’s (2005) focus on social action based organization of space casts local spatial characteristics as dependent on planned human activities to create particular locations in relation to their immediate and extensive surroundings. The political geographer and planner Soja (2010), in Seeking Spatial Justice, forms the notion of a comprehensive “Third-space” which is everything social, physical, historical and psychological. These ideas are part and parcel of the spatial policy toolbox supporting the idea that land is a representative commodity resource, apportioned via policy decisions that are subject to sociospatial narrative influencing its planned conception. In the case of Israel, multiple socially constructed perceptions and ideals relating to the same territorial space promote competing land claims that pose ethical policy dilemmas for policy-makers and political strategists. Low (2008: 34–36, 40) uses the example of the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, where more than one perception can be applied to the same geographic coordinates, to show that different spaces can be created at the same ‘locale’. Here opposing narratives representing meanings and symbolisms, emotional qualities of space and belief systems produce active conflict over land resources, couched in historically documented or imagined geographic closeness or overlap of various ethnicities in regional space.

### 2.1 The concept of space within regional divisions of states

Referring to the integration or exclusion of communities within geographic space, Held (2005: 331–358) raises two concepts operating simultaneously within modern states. One is the inclusionary integrative city encouraging openness and heterogeneity, and the second is the state itself as it relies on borders

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8. See footnote #4.
and boundaries to promote policies defining internal exclusivity. Less attention is paid to homogeneous land distributions or exclusive enclaves within regional divisions of states (Lobao and Hooks 2007). Yet national policies allocating spatial resources among ethnic or cultural groups remain a source of territorial dispute and social conflict within state regions including: Quebec, Northern Ireland, Kurdistan, Israel, and many more (Stavenhagen 1998).

According to Schuerkens (2003: 216–218), place related local cultures vie with incorporated global trends to influence existing life experiences and cultural understandings. She shows that while globalization contributes new perspectives alien to traditional local lifestyles, it can also result in an intensification of local cultural traditions and identities. Preservation of cultural identity then becomes a countertext to globalization and a political right. Both trends are apparent in terms of Israeli policies on spatial distribution, given inherent contradictions between the desire to emulate modern global multicultural urban lifestyles and the need to protect ethnic, religious and cultural rights defining sociospatial identity.

Examination of policy process for allocation of territorial space within regional divisions of states should widen conceptions related to distributions of population groups that shape the essence of space. In doing so, our frame of reference is unitary state policy within uni-level (non-unionized) centralized national governments, i.e. the State of Israel as a parliamentary democracy with a multi-party unicameral system. Israel’s democratically elected government routinely deliberates on policy issues concerning culture, ethnicity and spatial allocations of territories.9

### 3 Political social and ethnographic paradigms of geographical space and place

The following geospatial concepts employ interpretive frameworks to analyze policy allocations and distributions of land and territorial resources. In case analysis pertaining to spatial conflict or non-consensus over commodity resource

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9. Israeli democratic deliberation of spatial distribution issues is arguably hindered in the absence of direct regional or local geographic representation by elected members of parliament. Despite this, Israeli democracy holds an efficient separation of powers: the legislature (Knesset); the executive (government); and the judiciary (court system-independent and guaranteed by law). Checks and balances provided by basic laws define citizen and minority rights and governing structures, proportional party representation via democratic election, and freedom of expression in and outside the press (Government of Israel 2018b).
allocations, application of ethnographic, ideological and neo-institutional paradigms should prove more productive than the socioeconomic paradigm of poverty and welfare. This is because the latter allows for economic based sociospatial mobility as a remedy for assumed political weakness, which is in contrast to the position of cultural and ethnic groups who might wield political influence but may not seek or achieve sociospatial mobility.

3.1 Poverty and welfare in sociogeographic space

Fundamental components of policy for distribution of resources in organized communities and societies are geared towards an understanding of who receives what, where, why and from whom. Here, emphasis is placed on analysis of nation-state governing policies that perpetuate sociospatial inequalities. Lack of ‘social capital’ in poorer areas may reinforce social gaps relating to quality of public services that make up life chances. This focus assumes a contextual relation to Marxist reasoning on capitalism, labor and means of production. If ‘social landscapes’ change, globalize or specialize in production of goods, welfare services are affected (Mohan 2003). Within this paradigm, poverty and welfare are studied as a main event. State policies promoting empowerment of particular communities over others, within similar socioeconomic brackets and legal administrations, are discussed primarily in terms of social welfare policy programs with spatial characteristics; e.g. tax-based incentives in targeted locales.

Affluent populations can afford to purchase private welfare services such as education and health (Mohan 2003) and participate in residential markets dictating spatial order based on socioeconomic class. A central concept of the literature on sociogeographic distributions relates to the use of policy decisions to eliminate such exclusionary practices and inequalities in order to promote the public ‘good’. Paradoxically, this may include anti-discriminatory policies of social empowerment that perpetuate homogeneous population distributions within segregated catchment areas targeted for financial benefit (Shapira Hellerman 2015). In this sense, government dictated budgetary efficiency alone should not be used to entrench separation of populations along socioeconomic lines because this could amount to ghettoization, as distinct from the political right to establish or preserve communities based on cultural heritage or ethnic identity.

3.2 Power and politics in geographical spaces

Strength, safety, security, self-rule and social development are bases for consolidation of groups that form nations and evolve territorially subject to perpetual historical modification (Elden 2013). Discussing nationalist exclusive and homogeneous perspectives of space, Jones, Jones and Woods (2004) imply
that nations may claim sovereign geographical territory complete with representative physical and meaningful landscape, historic narrative, cultural memories and shared identity. These landscapes are a close derivative of unique old folk cultures that lived on rural lands, attached to “the soil” or “homeland”, e.g. the Jewish nation’s return from exile to the Israeli state and its struggle with Arab and minority groups over land and land related symbolisms (Jones et al. 2004: 88,93). Such nations have loyal citizenries ready to protect their homelands. States, nations and minority groups may strive for nation-statehood by way of violence, political power or economic negotiation.

Nation-states emphasize place-oriented common identities based on social divisions such as race, class, ethnicity, religion, cultural roots or belief systems. Oppressive policies representing a dominant ‘discourse of place’ may use statutory, judicial or targeted economic incentives to organize landscapes by forcefully or bureaucratically restricting or guiding movements of certain populations (Jones et al. 2004: 116–133; Yiftachel 1998). In this vein, Giddens’ (1985) defines the notion of modern bureaucratic control of territories within fixed nation-state boundaries that are protected at the expense of other nations. Only non-nation-states, made up of multicultural inclusionary mixes of culture, are free to operate in the common interest (Anderson 1983: 1–34).

On the sub-national level, certain regions or communities within nation-states, holding common interests and or national identities, may wish to seek territorial integrity or autonomy from the state (Jones et al. 2004; Mlinar 2004: 2). At the very least they might strive to increase their relative power by gaining political, budgetary/economic, or cultural benefits. Amidst questions of affiliation and loyalty, some groups may prefer to combine official recognition of their collective identity with secondary allegiance to the state, as in the case of Israeli Arabs and arguably of Haredi Jews (i24NEWS 2018). Emphasizing strength, and power ‘in numbers’, political issues are viewed in terms of how they impact and advance community interests. Pressure groups and local institutions with common goals can form coalitions to accommodate their accumulation of resources (land). Political coalitions may promote leadership determined by a blend of elite power networks that use control of resources to define beliefs, prejudices and discrimination (Jones et al. 2004: 112–113). Communal cultural isolation by choice or self-segregation can serve as a practical identity sharpening tool to consolidate powerful lobby interests and focus on delivery of exclusive benefits. This type of homogeneous spatial division, often employed by Israeli minorities, is the opposite of ghettoization because it emphasizes empowerment and development of social capital in terms that render populations spatially separate but equally entitled. It is relevant to the Canadian ‘mosaic’ model of spatial distribution (Hyman et al. 2011).
3.3 People and cultures: creation of exclusionary territories within geographical spaces

Ethnographic dialogues on space move beyond socioeconomic and social justice based paradigms to focus on human rights from the point of view of cultural groups in space. Low (2017: 15–19) explains the philosophies of Newton, Leibnitz, Kant and others regarding places as bodies positioned in space that are non-existent “except in relation to time, experience, thought, objects and events”. The built environment is created and shaped using historical, cultural, symbolic or religious variables to identify ethnic populations with particular territories, so that appropriation of space by some groups may entail exclusion of others. The combination over time of physical spaces with space related social interactions, such as language and common memories, can be contested and fought over by competing groups, as in the case of Israeli Jews and Arabs. Low’s (2017: 39) explanatory “social construction” perspectives of space are conceived as a result of social process using political and policy conflicts and control mechanisms to affect group actions and spur spatial processes (e.g. migration). His “social production” perspectives differ in that they explore historic economic and political motives for deliberate physical planning, changing and development of particular spaces. Space is ordered, to shape ‘landscapes of power’, emphasizing and perpetuating dominant political and economic ideologies at the expense of weaker ones (Low 2017: 38, 40–42, 70). A classic example is Haussmann’s Parisian boulevards supporting state controlled capitalist social order to the exclusion of working classes from the city center. Also, “neoliberal spaces” are planned to protect middle and upper class communities who can fund high standard living space for themselves by excluding others (Harvey 1996: 231).

In some states land ownership/tenure is subject to expropriation or reallocation for public purposes. Forman and Kedar (2004) intimate that in establishing the State of Israel, systematic expropriation of absentee lands served to substantiate symbolic control of space. Purposeful ordering of space usually requires access to resources, but may also be used by local bottom-up community or cultural enclaves contesting place and seeking to resist dominant oppression (Low, 2017:19). Accordingly, spatial order as a source of power and domination can design built environments to exert policies of social control, but might alternatively promote liberation from control. We posit that this is part of the sociopolitical processes taking place in the modern State of Israel, as Haredi and Arab minority groups direct political power and global support in favor of their rights to exclusive cultural land claims.
3.5 Paradigms of spatial resource allocation and distribution; rights and benefits

In sum, spatial concepts from multidisciplinary perspectives assume that land is a valuable public commodity resource in space to be distributed by decision-makers in accordance with monetary, social or political power. Werlen’s (2000; 2005: 55) model of Spaces in Actions proposes a concise synthesis of various theories by sharpening distinguishing features of creative economic, political and cultural dimensions that dominate spatial boundaries and temporal coordinates, to imply rights of usage, jurisdiction or ownership. The capitalist land market is rational, while the political territorialization of space is government regulated to include/exclude actors and utilities. Cultural communication between geospatial constructs and experience is embedded in symbolic/historical meaning. Space is constructed by dynamic process separating power and powerlessness in relation to socioeconomic status of populations, or by alignment of political power with heritage and tradition respecting ethnocultural community land rights (Leicht and Jenkins 2007). Space can be created and designed by ruling entities for purposes of segregation (ghettoization), but may also be produced by socioeconomic or minority pressure groups to oppose institutions of power and promote spatial ‘justice’.

Table 1 applies the conceptual paradigms above to basic questions; what is allocated to who, by whom, when, where, why and how. The compared paradigms are interrelated and tend to overlap, but yield certain distinctions regarding spatial conflict over public lands, which are a scarce commodity resource. Where prevailing ideals can be synthesized, they form a conceptualized fabric basic to this conflict, as a pattern emerges to focus on the rights of specific interest groups to benefit from land resources. In this sense, political scientists employ cultural symbolism to provide reasoning behind the right to claim spatial territory with defined boundaries as the pursued benefit, while ethnologist symbolisms hold emotional/psychological spatial meaning and identification as coveted benefits in their own right. Ethnologists depend on belief systems that create spatially related group consciousness, and sociologists are apt to lean on Marxist conceptions concerning spatial distributions of labor and capital. The ‘when’ ‘where’ and ‘why’ of most paradigms tend to support historical and temporal bases carrying claims to land rights. Distribution of land, territories, spaces, places and services is widely expected to happen within the framework of top-down regulated governance, although ethnologists consider that groups can attribute or ascribe spaces/places to themselves by bottom-up means. Tools and methods of allocation are ultimately rooted in economic, legal or regulative governing principles and policies decided amidst conflicting claims to spatial entitlement.
Table 1: Paradigms for study of spatial resource allocations, distributions, rights and benefits.

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<tr>
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<th>ECONOMICS</th>
<th>POLITICS</th>
<th>SOCIOLOGY</th>
<th>ETHNOGRAPHY</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FOCUS</strong></td>
<td>commodity markets</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>poverty, welfare</td>
<td>human rights</td>
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<td><strong>WHO</strong></td>
<td>pursues rights/benefits</td>
<td>individual investors, private</td>
<td>nations</td>
<td>socioeconomic groups</td>
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<td>companies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WHAT</strong></td>
<td>rights/benefits are pursued or</td>
<td>commodity or resource, e.g. land</td>
<td>exclusive ownership and control</td>
<td>public services, local spatially</td>
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<td></td>
<td>allocated/distributed</td>
<td>or services purchased or earned</td>
<td>of physical territory with</td>
<td>targeted public education or</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>boundaries or borders</td>
<td>health services that make up</td>
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<td>“life chances”</td>
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<td><strong>WHOM</strong></td>
<td>by whom are rights/benefits</td>
<td>market forces that are free or</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>governing policies/governance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>allocated/distributed</td>
<td>regulated</td>
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<td><strong>WHEN</strong></td>
<td>are rights/benefits pursued or</td>
<td>supply exceeds demand or</td>
<td>now or in the past, subject to</td>
<td>disadvantaged populations rise</td>
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<td>allocated/distributed</td>
<td>consumption is deemed necessary</td>
<td>perpetual modification, shifting,</td>
<td>up and force capitalism to pay</td>
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<td>change in time</td>
<td>attention (Marxist theory)</td>
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<td><strong>WHERE</strong></td>
<td>are rights/benefits pursued or</td>
<td>wherever there is opportunity</td>
<td>socioeconomic landscapes</td>
<td>culturally meaningful</td>
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<td>allocated/distributed</td>
<td>to be optimized</td>
<td>comprising ‘haves and have</td>
<td>symbolic landscapes</td>
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<td><strong>WHY</strong></td>
<td>are rights/benefits pursued or</td>
<td>profit</td>
<td>common autonomy, unity, sovereignty</td>
<td>common memories or experiences</td>
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<td>allocated/distributed</td>
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<td>and interests, e.g. strategy for</td>
<td>with common interpretation of</td>
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<td>safety, peace, protection,</td>
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<td>progress</td>
<td>based on common value systems</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
HOW
are rights/benefits pursued or allocated/distributed (methods, tools)

| monetary power | administrative, legal, regulative power or control evolving through process | state incentives, targeted welfare programs, redistribution of monetary resources, preferred or reverse discrimination | stories and language of spatial belonging, planned ordering of space to shape landscapes and built environments |

The following considerations, based on comparison of multidisciplinary paradigms in Table 1, identify dominant strains of reasoning to explain conflict within constitutions of space, as related to collective or individual rights to benefit from land resources:

1. Concerns relating to culture, poverty/welfare and power may produce inequality in space that determines who is included/excluded from which territory or place. This can apply to individuals as well as communities.

2. Meaningful historical cultures and symbolisms that affirm a desire to achieve territorial or space related objectives hold an abstract quality that is subjective. These may draw concurrent or competing claims from various communities regarding a specific location.

3. Competing operative political and/or institutional driving forces may be powerful, and probably take precedence over sociological theories of inequality in space. Poverty and welfare issues relating to equitable distributions of resources hover in the background of spatial thought, but may not be a deciding factor in actual allocations of space.

4 A study of the two largest minority populations in Israel

Israeli planning for diverse populations is presented here as a case in point, proposing land as an indicator for testing strategic spatial policy actions in relation to institutional decision-making. The spatial dispersion of populations and distribution of lands among Arab and Haredi minority populations in Israel are mapped below, in terms of established socioeconomic indices, demonstrating sociocultural conflict over land. Accepting that land can be an economic, social or cultural commodity as well as a policy tool for control of populations (Low 2017); we address Israeli geographic population distributions to distinguish between institutionally forced socioeconomic or ideological segregation (Yiftachel 1998) and state allocation of territorial rights among politically powerful or bottom-up contenders.
4.1 Spatial dispersion and distribution of lands among Arab and Haredi populations in Israel

According to statistical projections, Haredi and Arab populations will each represent approximately a quarter of Israel’s total population respectively within the next 30 years (CBS 2016). Both are presently and potentially large populations with political representation, and are recognized as minority or special groups (Government of Israel 2015). As a way of defending cultural heritage, Israeli law protects the right to homogeneous settlement for special and minority groups (High Court of Justice 1998). The Israeli government has passed resolutions favoring minorities: Resolution number 922 represents a special funding package for planning and development services to Arab populations (Government of Israel 2015), and Resolution number 1823 is intended to provide Haredi communities with planned land for the provision of housing and services (Government of Israel 2016).

The majority of Arabs and the majority of Haredi live in homogeneous cultural enclave communities of choice (CBS 2016). Those living in mixed towns and cities tend to congregate in homogeneous neighborhoods where culturally specific goods and services are easily accessed. Although a high percentage of those living in mixed Israeli communities are educated, the actual percentage of minorities in integrated neighborhoods is almost negligible (Rekhes 2007). Arabs live mostly in peripheral rural regions while Haredi are drawn to urban living that provides walkability and public transport to education, religious, food and other services tailored to their way of life. Haredi gravitate to their traditional communities in Israel’s center, even when living conditions reach densities below 10 square meters per person, which is less than 0.5 rooms per person inclusive of shared living space (Shapira Hellerman 2015). In all Jewish households – including Haredi – the average number of rooms per person in 2014 was 0.82. In Arab households, the average number of rooms per person was 1.35 (CBS 2014).

Arab communities tend to prefer their original historic “home” villages situated primarily in peripheral areas of the country or bordering the territories of Judea and Samaria in less urbanized East Jerusalem (Khamaisi 2013). Approximately

10. Political involvement of minority sectors is manifest in national and municipal elections. Minorities run political and administrative affairs in their own municipalities and further community interests by electing representatives to parliament, where they bolster the status of minority groups and avail of national benefits (Knesset 2015).

11. In Israel 93% of lands are in the public domain, managed and allocated by state agencies.
44% of Arabs live in almost exclusively homogeneous Arab towns and communities in northern Israel, another 20% in the Jerusalem area, 10% in the center of the country, and 12% in the south (Bedouin). A mere 1% reside in the Tel Aviv area (CBS 2014). Homogeneous locales provide them with their own spatial, educational, cultural, communicational (linguistic) and political spheres (Tama 35 2015). There are 129 homogeneous Arab localities in Israel, including seven Bedouin towns established by the State of Israel in the Negev (southern) region between the years 1968 and 1989. The Abu Basma Regional Council, established in 2003, comprises eight family villages. Government planning aims to free-up land for housing and development while allowing populations to remain within defined locations in their ancestral homelands. Additional plans have been approved for a new Arab town and a new Druze village in the Western and Northern Galilee regions (Bousso 2016; Zafrir 2014).

A statistical report by the Israel Democracy Institute shows that approximately 80% of Haredi prefer to isolate themselves within their own enclaves (Malach et al. 2016). According to a Seker Kehlacha survey, at least 68% of Haredi consciously choose to live in separate towns and a further 13% in separate neighborhoods that provide institutions affiliated with particular religious leaders (Shapira Hellerman 2018). In the words of the Israel Democracy Institute report: “(They) have chosen to erect walls of holiness to separate themselves from society...This voluntary segregation is virtually all-encompassing, extending not only to beliefs and opinions unique to this community but also to spatial, educational, cultural, communicational and political spheres.” (Malach et al. 2016: 3). Towns like Elad, Bnei Brak and parts of Beit Shemesh are populated almost entirely by Haredi. The Israeli government plans to build at least three more Haredi towns, while maximizing potential for expansion of existing ones (Zicherman 2016).

12. As a subgroup of the Israeli Arab minority population, Bedouin number approximately 250,000 persons. They claim ownership of lands (totaling almost 60,000 hectares) based on historic nomadic tribal wanderings, sometimes drawing economic and other valuable compensation in exchange for land (PMO 2013).
13. In 2013, more than half the Haredi population lived in homogeneous towns at the country’s center, exclusive of those living in Jerusalem’s homogeneous Haredi neighborhoods (Malach et al. 2016).
14. Despite acute housing shortages for ‘separate’ Haredi communities, Haredi leaders are reluctant to guide their populations toward new urban developments in peripheral regions, insisting on proximity to main Haredi population centers (Zicherman 2016).
4.2 Housing expenditure and average income

According to Israel’s 2015 national household expenditure survey, 24.7% of household expenditures in Israel’s main cities were spent on housing. The average income per capita was highest in Tel Aviv, as were monthly household expenditures (CBS 2016). Yet Bnei Brak, a Haredi enclave neighboring Tel Aviv, had the lowest monthly income (comprised mainly of government subsidies) and expenditure per capita. The survey shows that real estate purchase and rental fees are more expensive in Tel Aviv and the central region, while the cost of an average apartment in the five largest most centrally located Haredi communities is lower than in other central towns in Israel (Malach et al. 2016). Comparing average costs of apartments per square meter in various locations, we find this is also true of Arab enclaves at the center of the country, such as east Jerusalem and Kfar Qasim (Madlan 2018). The proportion of apartment owners among Haredi Jews is roughly 75% as compared with the national average which stands at 67% (Malach et al. 2016). For Arab populations, the figure is 85% (CBD 2014).

There is a high rate of homeownership within these minority communities relative to the proportion living beneath the poverty line (equal to 50% of the median disposable income per standard person). The proportion of poor Haredi families is far greater than that of the general population; 52% as opposed to 19% (Malach et al. 2016). The incidence of poverty among Arab families at 49.2% is almost equally prevalent (CBD 2016). Given the large number of children per family unit (5.0 for Haredim and 4.6 for Arabs), per capita income for Haredi and Arabs both is significantly lower than that of the general population (CBS 2014; Malach et al. 2016).

4.3 Summary analysis

Statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that Arab and Haredi populations tend to reside in culturally homogeneous enclaves. Haredi tend to live in high density religious housing communities in the geographic heart of the country, within close proximity of prime real estate, while Arabs tend to concentrate in low density peripheral culturally symbolic areas. The cost of a housing unit in Arab or Haredi enclaves is often lower than it is in nearby mixed areas, perhaps as a result of a perceived separation of housing markets along ethnocultural lines (Tzion 2016; Yubman and Fleishman 2014); or because religious lifestyles clash.

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15 A family in Israel is considered poor when its disposable income, divided by a number of standard persons, is lower than the poverty line per standard person (Endblid et al. 2016).
heavily with mainstream culture inviting less outside demand for housing within cultural enclaves. There may even be a concerted effort made by residents and municipal representatives to exclude ‘alien’ sectors (Hason 2017; Shpigel and Huri 2018). Although cheaper housing in the center of the country should be a catalyst for sectorial integration, especially in a soaring market, this is not generally the case. Notably, there is no legal basis for allowing all citizens to enjoy purchasing conditions offered to minorities within the context of reverse discrimination (High Court of Justice 1998; Sofer 2007).16

Table 2: Poorest sectors in Israeli society achieve housing preferences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>Projected percentage of total population</th>
<th>Projected percentage of total population</th>
<th>Percentage of population below poverty line</th>
<th>Average family size</th>
<th>Percentage of population owning homes</th>
<th>Living density - persons per room</th>
<th>Percentage living in homogeneous enclaves</th>
<th>Members of parliament*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARABS</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAREDI JEWS</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEWS (without Haredi)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL MIXED</td>
<td>100% = 8,843,000</td>
<td>100% = 15,607,600</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CBS 2014-2016; Knesset 2015)
*Statistics include Arab and Haredi MPs belonging to sectorial political parties only. There are also Arab and Haredi MPs from mainstream parties. Haredi parties joined the 2015 coalition government.16.

Persons outside minority and special populations are not generally eligible for the same [minority] benefits land and space, even if they are of similar socioeconomic backgrounds (High Court of Justice 1998; Sofer 2007).
Despite high levels of poverty among Haredi and Arab minorities, Table 2 documents high rates of homeownership possibly due to government facilitation of favorable conditions to help these populations purchase homes (PMO 2013).\textsuperscript{17,18} Thus Government acknowledgment of sociospatial communal activities and political or human rights lobbies play a role, together with High Court decisions, in protecting cultural ideals.\textsuperscript{19} This is accomplished via land distributions that facilitate individual rights within specific collective frameworks (Adalah 2018; Bousso 2015; Knesset 2015; Swirski et al. 1998). While these policies generally emphasize minority land rights, Israel’s Nation-state Law supports the premise of land distribution based on cultural heritage by deferring to the rights of a Jewish majority (Government of Israel 2018). Such perspectives may be intended to complement one another, but they are both in direct contrast to inclusionary policy endorsing non-discriminatory multicultural spatial order. The inclusionary principle is also supported by laws and High Court decisions viewing integration as a requirement for equality, and negating the legitimacy of exclusionary land allocations (Government of Israel 2011a; High Court of Justice 2000).

Universally declared goals of equitability, pluralism, social integration and inclusion wield an alluring power for spatial planning in democratic systems. These values address communities and individuals alike, but perhaps in different ways. While appealing to multiculturalism, they may also be interpreted to justify resource allocations that preserve exclusive minority enclaves (Government of Israel 2011a). Ethnocultural considerations can be a catalyst for the creation of regional spaces promoting minority groups, and egalitarian interpretations of social justice may sanction the use of policy and political strategies such as reverse discrimination for equal opportunity divisions of spatial resources. There is however an inherent difference between the two opposing mindsets of declared unlimited rights to cultural and religious freedom of choice in space. The first validates the right to claim and hold spatial infrastructures, serving to actively build and maintain exclusive community cultures as described by Low (2017: 15–19), and the second is enjoyed by all individuals within accepting and

\textsuperscript{17.} Contributing to the necessity of government aid are unique cultural spending preferences and financial pressures, e.g., purchase of a home as a precondition to marriage, also subsidized by family or communal contributions (Malach et al. 2016).

\textsuperscript{18.} An example of government facilitation is the Bill on Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, based on land claims (proven or not), proffering legal provisions for compensation in land and funds, ensuring appropriate housing for generations (PMO 2013).

\textsuperscript{19.} The independent Judiciary regularly rules against government and parliament, overturning decisions perceived to threaten human rights. The state adheres to court rulings (Adalah 2018).
inclusive multicultural spaces. This distinction calls into question spatial policies that grant formal accessibility to lands, exclusively benefitting some communities over others and communities over individuals. For instance, the adoption of policies for reverse discrimination privileging Israeli Arab and Haredi may uphold human rights regarding protection and perpetuation of cultures, in conjunction with individual freedoms to join communities, but those policies would violate the right of individual non-community members who are not entitled to the same spatial resource benefits. In effect, the same state policies that openly regulate or channel sociospatial conditions to support universality and concord may also facilitate liberal individual and collective freedoms to choose, perpetuate and create culturally exclusive communal living spaces (UN 2007). Land benefits could be directed at indigenous minority groups, but should not be at the expense of the rights of other contenders. Policy decisions based on cultural, ethnic, religious and emotional land claims appear less clear-cut in the face of inclusionary idealism and therefore suffer the ambiguity of practical delays and reevaluations. This paradox is couched in specific situations of sociospatial conflict and may epitomize the ambiguity which is discussed by Matland (1995) and encompassed by Israeli policy for land distribution.

5 Concluding remarks

Questions of moral equity might necessarily accompany situations of conflict, confronting policy-makers on issues related to minority versus majority and collective versus individual rights to benefit from spatial commodities. If state policies relating to concepts of physical space draw on social demographics, history, human culture, psychological imagery and symbolism to help explain the distribution of land based commodity resources, the construction of spatial order should rest not only on practical narrative but on active promotion of policies for social equity.

Granting that socioeconomic spatial theory regards homogeneity in space as a prescription for poverty, where affordability of land could enable spatial integration (Ethington 1997; Mohan 2003), policies advocating multiculturalism emerge in response to solidly based petitions for anti-discriminatory ethnic and cultural rights. While segregation creates social and emotional distance in everyday life, space and time (Ethington, 1997), there is scant evidence to suggest that spatial proximity would invoke social proximity. In cases such as Israel, strong historically symbolic narratives and idylls override socioeconomic coincidence. In this regard, reversal of policies promoting separation may remove some barriers to social integration, but this would not necessarily cause funda-
mentally separate groups such as Arabs and Haredi to adopt common interests and live in integrative inclusionary multicultural locales. Perhaps a conceivable sociospatial option might resemble Canadian policies that allow individuals to assimilate in an atmosphere of multicultural inclusivity accorded by divisions in space, forming a cultural or ethnic ‘mosaic’ to enhance their cultural capital and encourage inter-communal interactions (Hyman et al. 2011). The applicability of this model to regional and local landscapes makes it a mature and honest alternative to the sense of ambiguity defining policies for spatial distribution in situations of sociopolitical conflict, as represented by the case of Israel.

It would indeed be democratically unacceptable to force dispersal of communities into alternate systems of spatial cohesion. If culturally diverse groups in Israel express a mutual desire to live in separate enclaves within the state, on a ‘separate but equal’ basis, a range of community housing solutions could be offered that openly exclude outside individuals, even at comparable socio-economic levels (Khamaisi 2013; Rekhes 2007). Separate spatial distribution of lands among minority populations in Israel may also promote empowerment, substantiating political lobby for resources, such that economic thresholds expedite the provision of adequate goods and services required by homogeneous communities (Shapira Hellerman 2015). This is somewhat perpetuated at judicial and professional meso levels of implementation (Tama 35 2015). Such ideals garner support from morally driven government resolutions or affirmative action policies (Government of Israel 2015, 2016; Knesset 2015), so that segregations are less likely to be based on top-down political and institutional motivations than on minority ethnocultural pressures with historical overtones.20

Sociospatial divisions can intensify power relations and varying notions of what is in the public interest, thereby producing policy dilemmas. We argue that equitable policies must balance calculated distributions of spatial public resources, comprising unique heritages in specific locales, with the promotion of social and cultural integration in other places. As a commodity resource land/space is conceived by power and the influence of sociocultural input (Lefebvre 1991). Land should be planned and built on responsible practical policy. In doing so, there can and must be policy criteria by which clear and transparent active government policy could be regulated, implemented and administered to support a range of spatial options accommodating various-communities. To bolster this process, meso levels professionals could take a lead role in initiating its implementation.

Finally, the employment of land as an indicator for public commodity resources emerges as a plausible basis for assessment of policy process concerning resource

allocations and distributions of populations within regions of national geographic space. Land policy decisions must necessarily consider dynamic, historical and contemporary sociocultural political and economic variables. Interested political actors represent specific values along the spectrum of territorial conflict, seeking power to control, protect or pursue coveted commodity resources. Policy-makers, institutions and politicians allocate and reallocate lands in an atmosphere of compromise stemming from multiple ideological and symbolic qualities of space. This article highlights the quest for fair and reasonable policy solutions relating to instances of emotional and practical conflict that generate ambiguous policy platforms (Matland 1995). Further study might concentrate on in-depth analysis of policy processes to pinpoint critical stages that shape decisions and accommodate equitable implementation outputs for spatial distribution within state regions. Research of the extent to which policies are impacted by dominant institutional, professional and private world-views could help identify emotionally charged political or institutional decisions permeated by incongruous contradictory policy decisions. Continued focus on sociocultural issues should contribute to the nominal discourse addressing chronological constructions of conflict-oriented processes to support a reconceptualization of prevailing policy models, and reify policies encouraging spatial diversity and power-sharing, equitable distribution of spatial resources and productive spatial management.

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